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Software security researchers commonly reverse engineer and analyze current
malicious software (malware) to determine what the latest techniques malicious at-
tackers are utilizing and how to protect computer systems from attack. The most
common analysis methods involve examining how the program behaves during ex-
ecution and interpreting its machine-level instructions. However, modern malicious
applications use advanced anti-debugger, anti-virtualization, and code packing tech-
niques to obfuscate the malware’s true activities and divert security analysts. Malware
analysts currently do not have a simple method for tracing malicious code activity at
the instruction-level in a highly undetectable environment. There also lacks a simple
method for combining actual run-time register and memory values with statically
disassembled code. Combining statically disassembled code with the run-time values
found in the memory and registers being accessed would create a new level of analysis
possible by combining key aspects of static analysis with dynamic analysis.
This thesis presents EtherAnnotate, a new extension to the Xen Ether virtu-
alization framework and the IDA Pro disassembler to aid in the task of malicious
software analysis. This new extension consists of two separate components - an en-
hanced instruction tracer and a graphical annotation and visualization plug-in for
IDA Pro. The specialized instruction tracer places a malware binary into a virtu-
alized environment and records the contents of all processor general register values
that occur during its execution. The annotation plug-in for IDA Pro interprets the
output of the instruction tracer and adds line comments of the register values in ad-
dition to visualizing code coverage of all disassembled instructions that were executed
during the malware’s execution. These two tools can be combined to provide a new
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is currently a lack of malicious software analysis applications that allow
in-depth, internal information about instruction-level behavior in a single toolset.
Individually, dynamic analysis tools provide a fast method for obtaining high-level
behavior of an executable while static analysis tools provide a slow, human-intensive
method to obtain detailed information of what causes this observed behavior or un-
observed behavior. This thesis aims to provide a convergence of these two analysis
strategies in EtherAnnotate and demonstrate the ability for new analysis information
to be obtained through its use.
This section provides a background on malicious software and malware analysis
to help describe the basis for the new research presented. Section 2 provides a context
of previous research that this paper extends from. Section 3 describes the new tools
that were developed in detail and the design decisions behind them. Section 4 presents
a case study where the new analysis tools are used on a recent malicious botnet binary
and the benefits and limitations are analyzed. Section 5 presents a second case study
which compares EtherAnnotate against current analysis tools during an investigation
of the SpyEye Trojan malware. Finally, Section 6 weighs the benefits and limitations
of the current research and list potential areas of further development.
1.1. BACKGROUND ON MALICIOUS SOFTWARE
The idea of computer software that is able to secretly replicate itself and execute
automatically on newly infected machines originated in the late 1970’s with mainframe
computers and the early 1980’s with personal microcomputers. In 1975, John Walker
introduced the program PERVADE on the UNIVAC 1110 mainframe which would
secretly copy its caller program (a game called ANIMAL in this case) to all available
directories on the system [3]. Seven years later, one of the first modern viruses
(although not malicious in intention) was written and distributed by Rich Skrenta for
the popular Apple II series personal computer. The software was named Elk Cloner
and would hook itself into the reset handler of the Apple II computer, such that
when the system was rebooted for the 50th time a poem Rich wrote would appear
2on the screen [4]. As personal computers exploded in popularity and knowledge of
how to design software that can covertly spread to new machines grew, the number
of malicious software attacks in the wild accelerated and became increasingly difficult
to defend against.
Today, malware can spread globally to thousands of computers in only a matter
of days and performs much more sophisticated and damaging attacks to systems [5].
A new trend in malicious software has been the increased prevalence of botnets - a
covert overlay network of personal computers which have been infected by malware
and receive orders from a centralized or peer-to-peer “command and control” com-
munication channel. Single botnet variants have been able to infect over a million
computers and typically either steal financial information (76% of phishing attacks
are for financial gain according to Symantec’s 2009 threat report [6]) from these ma-
chines or use them to perform coordinated DDoS attacks against large corporations
or government entities [7]. Currently, the most prevalent strategy to mitigate botnet
attack potential is to reverse engineer the malicious binaries that are dropped and
determine the identities of the command and control servers. Once the identities of
command and control servers are known, either the ISP can be contacted to shut
the server down or security companies can try to have DNS servers not recognize the
malicious IP addresses.
The number of new malicious attacks developed and launched against machines
increases every year, becoming more advanced and requiring more skilled analysis to
detect and defend against. Additionally, the source of malicious attacks has migrated
from devious hackers launching small and simple attacks to criminal organizations and
even nation states organizing sophisticated, targeted attacks against their adversaries.
Defending against malicious computer attacks has become a tremendous and critical
industry and research market and the need for comprehensive analysis and rapid
response grows every year.
1.2. BACKGROUND ON MALWARE ANALYSIS
In order to protect their anonymity from security analysts and increase the
difficulty of defense, malware authors generally obfuscate their code and their com-
munication channels. A very common method for hiding data from security analysts
3is for the malicious code to detect if common analysis tools are being used and change
its behavior if they are detected. One such method is to detect changes in system
behavior that occur when a software debugger is attached to the running process
(anti-debugging). In Windows, attaching a debugger (e.g., OllyDbg or WinDBG)
sets a variety of system flags and causes small details in system behavior to change
compared to a system without a debugger attached to a process [8]. Malware will
commonly detect these changes and either exit without performing any malicious ac-
tivity or perform suspicious activity to draw the malware analyst away from the real
malicious activity. There are anti-anti-debugging tools that can be used with debug-
gers that try to hide the debugger from detection although these are complicated and
only prevent detection from known methods.
Another method malware authors use to detect that their software is being
watched is to detect that the code is executing inside a virtual machine (VM). An-
alysts commonly run malware inside of a virtual machine in order to sandbox the
code from infecting the host machine and to enable the ability to “rewind” the state
of the system. Malware can detect that it is running inside of a virtual machine by
checking for virtualized hardware, differences in certain instruction return values, and
backdoor I/O ports used by the hypervisor to communicate to the VM [9]. As vir-
tualization is increasingly utilized today to consolidate physical server hardware into
virtual hardware, virtualization detection is not as prevalent debugger detection. This
is because not performing malicious activity when inside of a VM would eliminate a
large percentage of potential victims.
Table 1.2 provides an overview of common analysis detection methods that are
able to detect three common analysis tools and how the EtherAnnotate implemen-
tation compares. Debugger and virtualization detection are previously described;
dynamic analysis detection refers to the detection of any kinds of runtimes analysis
tools being used to monitor the malware. Common detection methods for dynamic
analysis are searching through the process list for known analysis tool filenames and
checking the consistency of API function calls to check for tools that may hook these
functions and cause changes in their instructions. OllyDbg is a common instruction-
level debugger for applications, Process Monitor is a common dynamic analysis tool
4Table 1.1. Overview of Detection Method Effectiveness Against Analysis Tools
OllyDbg ProcMon CWSandbox EtherAnnotate
Debugger Yes, with plugins No No No
Virtualization No No Yes Yes
Dyn. Analysis No Yes Yes, hook detect. No
for monitoring application behavior, and CWSandbox is a virtualized sandbox envi-
ronment that hooks API calls to record behavior. EtherAnnotate is imperceptible
to any operating system level detection attacks since no modifications are made to
the guest OS. Alternatively, the only detection attacks known to the author against
EtherAnnotate would have to rely on virtualization timing and device detection for
the Xen framework. There have been multiple papers on virtualization detection that
mostly focus on VMware [9] and other Type II hypervisors [10], additional research
is needed to determine a concise list of methods to detect the Xen 3.x framework.
Lastly, malware authors can obfuscate their code to static analysis by encrypting
or scrambling the binary operation codes (opcodes) in the executable. The binary file
then has a separate routine that decrypts or unscrambles the obfuscated opcodes so
that the original source code can be executed. Analysts can subvert this technique by
watching the application with a debugger and dumping the process’s memory after
it has been decrypted. Most advanced malware utilize very advanced encryption
and scrambling techniques that may involve multiple processes or other obfuscation
techniques that deceive disassemblers.
1.3. BACKGROUND ON INSTRUCTION TRACING
The idea of recording the set of all instructions executed during a program or
computer’s execution is a technique that started with early computer debugging sup-
port in the early 1970’s. Barnes et al. published an early paper that implemented
an instruction tracer in the HP 2100A minicomputer’s firmware in order to aid in
software debugging [11]. In addition to tracing all instructions executed on a com-
puter, the HP 2100A could selectively trace only instructions occurring in a specific
memory area. Since the tracer was implemented in the computer’s firmware, it was
able to trace operating system execution and any program’s execution without any
5modification to the underlaying programs. Instruction tracing has not changed much
since the early implementations, although today most instruction trace applications
are userland applications (i.e., separated from the OS kernel and unprivileged) that
run underneath the operating system. Most common integrated development envi-
ronments (IDEs) and debuggers contain some sort of instruction or event tracing
today.
In a sense, the instruction trace capabilities presented in this thesis are closer
to the early HP 2100A tracer than modern tracing applications. The EtherAnnotate
instruction tracer runs in an elevated privilege environment much like the firmware
on the minicomputer - it runs on the Xen privileged Dom0 environment and commu-
nicates solely with the Xen hypervisor. This similarity allows for EtherAnnotate to
monitor and trace any operation of a guest operating system, including the operating
system’s execution itself. Additionally, as each instruction is recorded, the values of
currently accessed variables are also recorded in the EtherAnnotate instruction trace
log.
1.4. IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEM
New methods that provide a deeper understanding of malicious software as it
is discovered are necessary to provide adequate defense against future computer net-
work attacks. A solution needs to be able to quickly analyze new malicious samples
and help security analysts deduce how the malware works fast enough to develop
a response strategy. Once an initial defense strategy has been formulated, any in-
creased accuracy in attribution of the original authors or groups responsible for the
malware will help security labs and government agencies find and eliminate the cause
of the threats. Finally, any tools that provide a more detailed understanding of the
malware’s operations will allow analysts to better predict future attacks and behavior
which can lead to proactive defense.
1.4.1. Early Response and Defense. Previous large-scale attacks by
worms and botnets have clearly shown the necessity for an early response and de-
terrent in order to mitigate the possible damage of coordinated attacks [12]. For
these globally spreading worms, the previous research focuses mostly on detecting
the presence of the large network of victim computers and issuing security notices
6about potential attacks and methods for defense. For smaller-scale, targeted attacks
with binary payloads it may be more pertinent to instead focus on the intentions of
the attack that can be deduced through internal analysis of the malicious payload.
Typical dynamic code analysis techniques as described in Section 2.3.2 provide a
quick, high level overview of the behavior of a binary during runtime. A lower, more
detailed knowledge of a complex malicious binary typically requires a larger amount
of time to be invested in static code analysis as described in Section 2.3.1, usually by
reverse engineering the assembly language instructions [13]. The EtherAnnotate anal-
ysis toolset presented in this thesis provides a convenient method for adding runtime
dynamic analysis information to a binary’s disassembled instructions with a minimal
number of changes to the computer system.
1.4.2. Attribution of Directed Attacks. The attribution of cyber at-
tacks on computer systems is a growing concern for both corporate security [14] and
national security [15][16]. The Department of Defense commissioned report on tech-
niques for attributing cyber attacks defines the term attribution as “determining the
identity or location of an attacker or an attacker’s intermediary” [15] and this is one
of the core goals of malware analysis. Network attack attribution is particularly dif-
ficult because of the inherently redundant and anonymous nature of the Internet and
computer systems. Attackers may plant code that waits an extended period of time
before causing damage or may work through intermediary machines unrelated to the
originating computer system. Simply tracing the IP address of a recorded cyber at-
tack may not provide a target to the attacker’s personal computer (e.g., use of cyber
cafes or rerouting the attack through victim machines) and in cases of anonymizing
overlay networks it may not even be possible to trace the originating machine [17].
Binary file attribution provides a similar level of difficulty in determining the
original author or even a general location of the originating attack. Since malicious
binary files are most often spread autonomously, the computer that sent the file to the
victim can not reliably be used as the true attacker’s origin. Common techniques for
binary attribution rely instead on correlating similar binary files based on common
patterns that can be identified between many samples in a large binary library [18].
This attribution, typically using n-gram analysis or Bayesian analysis, builds on the
hypothesis that malware written by the same author or authors will contain traits of
7those who wrote the original code - even in compiled form. Any uniquely identifying
information about a binary file can help with attribution; EtherAnnotate provides
a novel method for obtaining internal identifying strings not easily discovered using
current analysis methods.
1.5. CONTRIBUTIONS OF ETHERANNOTATE
The EtherAnnotate toolset presented in this thesis addresses the issues of provid-
ing a quick, in-depth analysis of malicious software by contributing a novel unification
of dynamic analysis and static analysis that is largely transparent to detection. The
EtherAnnotate toolset consists of two independent tools - an extension to the Xen
Ether malicious software analysis framework described in Section 3.2 and a plug-in to
the IDA Pro graphic disassembler described in Section 3.3. Previous static analysis
tools lack a transparent method for viewing the runtime data of a program’s exe-
cution in a visually coherent manner. The Ether additions allow for an instruction
tracer running outside of a virtual machine to monitor and transparently record the
variable values of a program while it executes. The IDA Pro plug-in takes the output
from the first tool and uses the variable values to annotate a graphical disassembly
of the malicious software’s code. Code coverage visualization is accomplished in-
side of IDA Pro by highlighting all instruction addresses listed in the EtherAnnotate
trace file. By combining the statically disassembled instructions of a malicious pro-
gram with annotations of its actual runtime values, this new visualization provides
an increased awareness of the program’s operations while a researcher performs static
code analysis. The author believes that this new toolset will contribute additional
knowledge to malware analysts and provide a starting point for additional research
in malware behavior analysis. Additionally, the later case studies in Section 4 and
Section 5 provide not only a comparison of analysis results from EtherAnnotate and
previous techniques, but also internal functionality insight of two popular malicious
applications.
82. RELATED WORK
The work completed in this thesis integrates new functionality into previous re-
search done on the Xen virtualization framework and the Ether analysis framework.
The Xen Ether framework was originally designed as a malware analysis tool that
allows instruction tracing, system call tracing, and automatic unpacking of malicious
binaries. This research extends the Ether framework to also record all processor reg-
ister memory access and supplement IDA Pro disassemblies with that information. A
review of recent research into botnet protocol reverse engineering and static/dynamic
analysis will help illustrate the design choices of this thesis. Sections 2.1 and 2.2
present previous areas of research that this thesis builds off of and extends. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents the current tools available both in research and production for ana-
lyzing complex malware that EtherAnnotate seeks to improve upon.
2.1. XEN ETHER MALWARE ANALYSIS
2.1.1. IBM VM/370 Operating System. The idea and usefulness of
running multiple, different operating systems on a single computer system was first
realized in the 1970’s by researchers at IBM [19]. The IBM VM/370 system split the
computer’s operating system into two components, the control program (CP) and
the Conversational Monitor System (CMS). The CP ran underneath all virtualized
operating systems and provided resource management and control to all of the virtual
machines. The CMS provided a virtual terminal for each virtual machine that the user
could interface with and appeared as though they were interfacing with a bare-metal
operating system. A key design criteria for the VM/370 software was that all virtual
operating systems running on top of the CP would execute the same instructions as
if they were running on the machine by theirself. Additionally, all operations in the
virtual machines were guaranteed to provide the same output if they were running in
a virtual environment as if they were running on a physical processor.
At the time, the VM/370 operating system was noted for its novel ability to
allow multiple users concurrent access to a single computer and the added security
provided by address space isolation between the virtual machines. Unfortunately,
9the idea of virtualization did not move outside of IBM’s mainframes and into the
personal computing sector until the last decade. IBM’s VM/370 operating system
ran on top of its System/370 mainframe which was designed to allow virtual machines
to execute on the processor without interference [20]. One vital design aspect that
came from the System/360 hardware was to divide all instructions into two mutually
exclusive sets: privileged and unprivileged instructions. Privileged instructions affect
the operations of the entire machine while unprivileged instructions only cause local
changes and are commonly called by user applications. The System/370 hardware
required all privileged instructions to be handled by a specific program, and the
VM/370’s Control Program transparently handled these instructions for its virtual
machines. Additionally, the System/370 hardware was designed to support virtual
memory from its introduction and allowed for the control program to imperceptibly
share physical memory between the virtual machines. The x86 hardware, which has
become the standard processor architecture in personal computing, was not designed
to support virtual machines and many workarounds have been developed in recent
years to enable virtualization on PCs.
2.1.2. The Xen Hypervisor. In 2003, a research group based at the
University of Cambridge published Xen, an open source x86 virtual machine monitor
(VMM) which (eventually) allowed unmodified operating systems to run in isolated
virtual machines [21]1. Xen now supports x86-64, Itanium, and the PowerPC archi-
tectures and is one of the most popular open source virtualization solutions today.
Although it was designed around 30 years after the original VM/370 software was
written, Xen shares many core similarities to IBM’s original virtualization solution.
The Xen framework consists of a Type I hypervisor which runs in a bare-metal config-
uration below all operating systems and virtual machines. Goldman’s original paper
on computer virtualization describes two different types of hypervisors that still hold
true with present solutions [22]. A Type I hypervisor runs on the bare hardware and
all virtual operating systems on the machine run virtualized on top of the hypervisor
as in Figure 2.1. A Type II hypervisor allows a standard operating system to run on
the bare hardware first, then the hypervisor is loaded on top of the operating system
and runs virtual machines from this higher level as in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.1. Logical Layout of a Type I Hypervisor
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Figure 2.2. Logical Layout of a Type II Hypervisor
The Xen framework modifies the standard Type I hypervisor design such that
there is a single privileged virtual machine named Domain 0 (Dom0) and all other
virtual machines, called unprivileged guest domains (DomU), act like standard virtual
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Figure 2.3. Logical Layout of the Xen Hypervisor
machines in other frameworks. Dom0 is the first domain to boot after the hypervisor
is loaded by the computer’s BIOS, and provides an administrative interface to the
Xen hypervisor [23]. Typically, Dom0 is a modified Linux kernel that appears to be
a normal Linux OS with the addition of a list of administrative commands that can
instruct the hypervisor to create new VMs, modify existing VMs, shutdown existing
VMs, or perform other hypervisor commands. All of the regular VMs will be spawned
from Dom0 and run on top of the Xen hypervisor and communicate through the
emulated devices created in Dom0 as shown in Figure 2.3.
In 2006, AMD released processors with its new AMD-V hardware virtualization
extensions and Intel released a similar new feature in its Core 2 processors named
VT-x. These extensions to the x86 specification implement additional functionality
that allows the x86 processor to fulfill the classical virtualization requirements. In
1974, Popek and Goldberg published the seminal paper on the formal requirements
of a processor instruction set to be virtualizable; in it they state that an instruc-
tion set must allow for equivalence, resource control, and efficiency with regard to a
virtual machine [24]. While previous x86 virtualization techniques had to resort to
clever software design to emulate equivalence and handle resource control, the new
virtualization extensions provide additional controls that are based on Popek and
Goldberg’s description of how to design a virtual machine monitor.
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The VT-x extensions create a new execution mode called VMX mode which in
turn has two separate privilege levels, VMX root mode and VMX non-root mode.
VMX root mode was designed as the mode that a hypervisor would execute in and
thus is very similar to execution outside of VMX mode other than the addition of a
new set of VMX instructions and access to new VMX storage variables. In VMX non-
root mode, the processor execution is restricted so that certain privileged instructions
(as defined in Popek and Goldberg [24]) are trapped and cause a new event called
a VMEXIT. By causing VMX non-root privileged instructions to trap to a prede-
termined location in hardware, the VT-x extensions now allow the x86 hardware to
provide the dispatcher and interpreter aspects of a VMM natively. The VMM in root
mode can configure the processor to trap on more instructions and actions than set by
default; additional traps can be set for if a guest tries to access certain I/O ports or
control registers in the processor [25]. Because VMX mode splits execution into root
and non-root modes, a virtualized operating system can be run unmodified and with
its kernel operating in current privilege level (CPL) 0. All modern operating systems
run their kernel in CPL 0 and all applications in CPL 3 which allows the hardware
to restrict user-mode applications from executing privileged instructions [26]. Be-
fore virtualization extensions were introduced to x86, VMMs would have to make do
by typically running the VM kernel in CPL 1 and the VM applications in CPL 2;
however, VMX root and non-root modes now have a separate CPL for each.
Xen 3.0 added support for Intel’s VT-x technology which is required and used
extensively by the Xen Ether framework. These extensions allow fine-grained control
of the hypervisor with hardware guarantees of transparency for the equivalence and
resource control criteria.
2.1.3. Ether Malware Analysis Framework. In 2008, Dinaburg et
al. published a paper describing their new framework called Ether which builds a
malware analysis tool into the Xen hypervisor [27]. Their framework runs solely on
the Xen hypervisor and Dom0 without requiring any modifications to the virtualized
guest operating system in DomU. The separation of the analysis framework and the
guest operating system is furthered by extensively utilizing the Intel VT virtualiza-
tion extensions. Ether requires the use of Xen 3.0 and hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion (HVM) guests which allows for the highest level of transparent malware analysis
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without the guest being able to detect analysis. Similar analysis using guest-based
virtualization (e.g., VMware [28] and VirtualBox [29]) or kernel-level analysis (e.g.,
VAMPiRE and CWSandbox) are not able to meet all of the transparency require-
ments presented. In the paper, the authors present five requirements of a transparent
malware analyzer that the Ether framework is able to fulfil:
• Higher Privilege: The malware analyzer must run at a higher hardware priv-
elege level than the guest operating system it is analyzing. Ether runs at the
highest privilege level, CPL -1 using Intel VT, while the guest operating sys-
tem’s kernel and userspace run at CPL 0 and 3 respectively.
• No Non-Privileged Side Effects: The malware analyzer must not induce
any side-effects in the guest operating system that a malicious program running
in the guest can detect. Ether has protected access to certain processor registers
and has isolated memory access to the guest through shadow page tables.
• Identical Basic Instruction Execution Semantics: All instructions exe-
cuted during analysis must have the same behavior as if they were running
directly on the processor (similar to Popek and Goldberg’s equivalence require-
ment). Ether uses the Intel VT virtualization extensions which rely on the same
hardware execution semantics as non-virtualized execution.
• Transparent Exception Handling: All exceptions must behave and return
during malware analysis as they would during normal execution. Ether only
traps certain exceptions, does not cause any new guest-detectable exceptions,
and does not modify the returned values of guest-generated exceptions.
• Identical Measurement of Time: A common attack to detect if a guest is
inside of a virtual machine is to measure the time required to execute a set of
instructions. If the analysis framework does not have a privileged clock that
it can modify to negate extra time taken for analysis and VM exits, then the
guest can detect the presence of virtualization. Intel’s VT extension provides
a separate execution cycle count in the hypervisor which can be used to offset
the logical clock return values.
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Figure 2.4. Logical Layout of the Xen Ether Framework
Once the Ether framework has been shown to provide transparent analysis into
a guest operating system, the authors present the implementation and examples of
analysis tools built on Ether. The main component of Ether, as seen in Figure 2.4,
runs in the Dom0 privileged Xen domain and provides user interaction to the analysis
tools. A small number of changes were made to the Xen hypervisor code to provide
abilities to trap different operations in the guest operating system. The main analysis
tools are split into instruction/memory write tracing and automated unpacking.
Ether implements instruction tracing of the guest operating system by setting
the trap flag after each instruction which causes a debug exception and a VM-exit
event that the Xen hypervisor handles. The Ether analysis framework receives con-
trol of the system after debug exceptions induced by the trap flag being set which
allows EtherAnnotate to perform its analysis and instruction trace logging in between
each guest instruction. The process Ether uses to set the guest’s trap flag and give
EtherAnnotate control of the system is thoroughly documented in Section 3.2.2.
2.1.4. VERA Malware Visualization. In 2009, Quist et al. published
one of the first research tools which extended the Xen Ether analysis framework
- particularly to increase the speed at which malware analysts can deobfuscate a
binary [1]. The Visualization of Executables for Reversing and Analysis (VERA)
architecture the authors present takes a standard instruction trace file from Ether
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combined with the original malicious binary to generate a visualization of code flow
during execution. Figure 2.5 from the original VERA paper depicts an example of
running VERA on the unpacking loop of a binary packed with the Mew packer. The
visualization is an abstraction of the instruction trace that Ether recorded of the Mew-
packed binary where each node represents a basic block (list consecutive instructions
until branch) and each edge represents a branch to a different basic block which was
taken. The green nodes represent basic blocks of instructions which are non-existent
in the original binary, such as areas that have been allocated on the heap or are
self-modifying. The red nodes represent sections with high entropy, such as when
the binary is executing in newly unpacked areas of its memory (since the original
memory was packed and has high entropy, cf. encrypted data entropy). In the Mew
packer example, code flow originally loops in an initial unpacking loop which appears
to unpack the second, larger loop since the second loop executes in an area of high
entropy. The second unpacking loop is much more complicated than the first from
the visual inspection of many more branches and longer loops. Eventually, it appears
that the second unpacking loop allocates memory to place the original code into and
progresses into the original entry point (OEP).
Quist mentions that although there are similar programs available which provide
graph-based analysis, Ether and VERA are unique in that they do not require the
use of debuggers or guest state modifications. This allows VERA to provide analysis
transparently to the guest operating system and any malware that may try to detect
debuggers or analysis tools [8].
2.2. INSTRUCTION TRACE MALWARE ANALYSIS
A research paper by Sharif et al. was published in 2009 on a similar project in
that it uses protected instruction tracing as the foundation for malware analysis [30].
In their paper, the authors present a system called Rotalume´ which executes malware
in a protected environment, records an instruction trace, and uses data-flow and taint
analysis to automatically reverse engineer emulator syntax and semantics. The paper
focuses on malware that has been protected using the increasingly common obfusca-
tion technique of emulation (common tools are Themida [31] and VMProtect [32]) .
An emulation protection scheme for binary obfuscation translates the original binary’s
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Figure 2.5. The Mew Unpacking Loop [1]
x86 instructions into bytecode instructions that can be interpreted by a program vir-
tual machine at runtime. This technique is similar to how Java programs are compiled
from their Java source code to an intermediate bytecode language that is executed
by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) which translates the bytecode instructions into
the current architecture’s opcodes. Once a program has been protected using one
of these emulator protection tools, the malware analyst only has a binary file with
the protector’s emulator code and the malware’s bytecode which has unknown syntax
and semantics for most of the common protectors.
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The Rotalume´ tool that Sharif et al. developed consists of three core strategies:
identifying the virtual program counter (VPC), identifying emulation behavior, and
extracting the syntax and semantics of the emulator. The authors developed a new
technique they call abstract variable binding which attempts to identify program
variables used during the execution of the program from an instruction trace. Their
goal is to find the VPC variable that emulators use as an index into the protected




The authors assume that most emulator protection methods will use this instruc-
tion fetching technique and develop a series of algorithms and rules for identifying
possible VPCs and using clustering to narrow the field down. Once the candidate
VPCs are narrowed down, the Rotalume´ system uses dynamic taint analysis to find
execution read behavior that is common to decode-dispatch emulators. For each po-
tential VPC found in the first section, the second section does 2nd-pass analysis on
all other instructions to see how the VPC memory is read and used by other instruc-
tions. Once a loop has been detected that executes at least twice and appears to
be decoding bytecode using the candidate VPC and dispatching execution then that
cluster is identified as the correct VPC cluster. Finally, the system monitors how the
execution proceeds after a dispatch has been made and looks for bytecode instructions
that change the VPC to try to identify branching instructions. Identifying control
flow transfers allows the authors to build control-flow-graphs that assist in analysis
of the behavior of the emulator’s bytecode language.
EtherAnnotate began development around the time that the paper on Rotalume´
was published and uses some of the same ideas about process introspection from an
overlaid system, but focuses on the angle of internal algorithm analysis. Where Ro-
talume´ focuses more on the automation of determining emulator protection semantics,
EtherAnnotate was developed as a tool that can provide run-time variable informa-
tion in a static analysis environment with a guarantee of transparency. Further work
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combining the variable identification techniques of Rotalume´ and EtherAnnotate in
a second-pass analysis could provide more easily understood information about what
values were stored in program variables at run-time.
2.3. CURRENT TOOLS AND ETHERANNOTATE’S ADDITIONS
Current tools for malware analysis are divided into static analysis tools and
dynamic analysis tools. Static analysis describes a process of observing a program
without actually executing any of the code - this provides a safer method of analysis
with malware and usually provides more detailed information but lacks knowledge of
actual execution behavior. Dynamic analysis is the process of executing a program
and monitoring any aspect of its behavior - this method typically provides a faster
understanding of the broad characteristics of a program but can skip over many of the
program’s inner workings. EtherAnnotate aims to provide a collection of benefits from
both static and dynamic analysis in a single package while eliminating many of the
detection issues caused by using intrusive dynamic analysis tools such as debuggers.
2.3.1. Static Analysis Tools. Static code analysis tools provide information
about a binary file without executing the file, therefore providing a static image of
the actual code and data contained within the file. The most common static analysis
tool is a disassembler which takes the processor opcode instructions that are stored
as raw data within the executable binary file and coverts these opcode datum into
the assembly language mnemonics that are human-readable. Disassemblers provide
an accurate representation of what instructions the processor will execute when the
binary file is loaded by the operating system. However, since the x86 instruction set
has a variable-length set of instructions, there can be multiple disassemblies possible
and some more advanced disassemblers are able to detect anti-disassembly procedures
and produce the correct disassembly. In addition to disassemblers, there is another
class of static analysis tools called decompilers which try to convert an executable’s
assembly code into a reasonable representation in a high-level language such as C.
These tools are much less accurate than disassemblers since there are a vast magnitude
of ways a compiler can take a high-level source code file and compile it down to
assembly code. Additionally, compilers typically optimize their compiled assembly
language code for either increased speed or decreased size - these optimizations can
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make it more difficult to recreate the original source code as a side effect. The
following list is a brief summary of static analysis tools that are commonly used in
malware analysis:
• Ollydbg: One of the more common debugging tools, OllyDbg can also be used
for its disassembling abilities although it does require the application under
analysis to be executed up to a point. OllyDbg also has wide 3rd party support
and there are many plug-ins for hiding from malware, dumping a program’s
memory contents to a file, and other uses.
• IDA Pro: A disassembler that recently added debugging functionality, IDA
Pro provides a graphical representation of the disassembled code that separates
it from other disassemblers. There is also a 3rd party plug-in API for C++ and
Python that is used for EtherAnnotate’s visualization tool.
• Hex-Rays: A decompiler plug-in for IDA Pro, Hex-Rays is one of the more
advanced decompilers and will convert disassembled instructions into C-like
pseudocode.
• PEiD: Using a list of signatures from various packing tools and compilers, PEiD
provides identification information about binary executables. DLL and EXE
files can be loaded by PEiD and if there is a known signature for the program
that compiled the binary or the program that packed the binary, PEiD will
report that information.
2.3.2. Dynamic Analysis Tools. In contrast to static code analysis tools,
dynamic analysis tools provide a method for monitoring and analyzing how a program
behaves during its execution. Dynamic analysis typically provides a quicker method
for obtaining information about an executable but it also is typically not as detailed
as what can be obtained through static analysis. One type of tool that straddles both
dynamic and static analysis is a debugger. Debuggers for malware analysis work with
the disassembled instructions of a binary file and allow the analyst to step through
each line of execution, view the active memory of a process, set breakpoints for the
execution to pause at, and other useful run-time modifications. Most other dynamic
analysis tools provide some sort of monitoring about the program, be it file activity,
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network activity, system call logging, or other attributes that may define a program’s
behavior. The list below is a brief summary of common dynamic analysis tools that
are commonly used in malware analysis:
• OllyDbg: The main purpose of OllyDbg is as a assembly-level debugger and
it is one of the most popular applications in this regard. The program provides
access to all internal data structures of a process and allows for a variety of
breakpoints to be set based on different conditions.
• ProcMon: There are many different events a process can cause during its ex-
ecution and Process Monitor (ProcMon) allows the malware analyst to track
most possible events. Some examples of process events are file system manipu-
lations, registry manipulations, and certain Windows API system calls.
• oSpy: This program will hook certain Windows API system calls related to
sending network traffic and record both the contents of the function arguments
as well as the call stack to each system call. A conversation log can be generated
with the contents of each network message sent or received.
• RegShot: The Windows registry provides configuration data for most system
operations and applications on the operating system. Regshot takes a snap-
shot before and after a program executes and provides a means for showing
differences in the registry that occurred.
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3. METHODOLOGY
This section presents the design decisions and implementation details of the
EtherAnnotate plug-in for Xen Ether (Section 3.2) and IDA Pro (Section 3.3). Ad-
ditionally, an explanation of the intended workflow of a malware analyst using the
EtherAnnotate toolset is presented in Section 3.1. Section 3.2.2 provides a secondary
contribution of insight into how the virtual guests, Xen, and Xen Ether communicate
and the code flow between them as learned during the development of EtherAnno-
tate. In addition to the topics covered in this section, further methodology design
changes were made during the second case study and these changes are presented in
Section 3.4.
3.1. ETHERANNOTATE WORKFLOW
The EtherAnnotate toolset was designed for use by a malware analyst who wants
to gain insight into the inner-workings of advanced malicious software as it would be-
have on a physical system. The proposed solution as shown in Figure 3.1 utilizes
two common software packages - Xen for virtualization and IDA Pro for disassembly
visualization - and provides a simple workflow that only requires three main tasks to
complete. The first task of the workflow is to take a binary file (that may or may not
be known to be malicious) and execute the file while under the EtherAnnotate envi-
ronment. As the figure and Section 3.2 describe, the EtherAnnotate environment is
an analysis tool which is built upon the previously developed Ether and Xen toolsets.
As the binary is executed, a log file is produced which contains all instructions that
were executed, a list of all register values referenced in the instructions, and a list
of all possible string array values referenced. This file will be the EtherAnnotate
specialized instruction trace used for the visualization process.
The second main task is simply for the malware analyst to transfer the EtherAn-
notate instruction trace file to a workstation that had IDA Pro and the EtherAnnotate
plug-in installed. The final workflow task is for the analyst to load an unpacked ver-
sion of the original binary file into IDA Pro. Binary packing and unpacking is detailed













Figure 3.1. The Workflow for Analyzing Malware with EtherAnnotate
Xen Ether, automatic unpackers, or manually - but these techniques are outside the
scope of this paper. Once the unpacked version of the binary is loaded and disas-
sembled by IDA Pro, the analyst chooses to load the EtherAnnotate plug-in from
IDA’s menus and chooses the EtherAnnotate instruction trace file produced by the
first task. At this point, IDA will execute the plug-in’s code and produce the results
detailed in Section 3.3.
3.2. XEN ETHER MEMORY MANIPULATION ANALYSIS
The first half of the EtherAnnotate plug-in consists of modifications to the
Xen Ether malware analysis framework in order to record additional data about the
malicious program’s state during execution. Specifically, the plug-in provides logged
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access to the run-time values of all referenced registers and uses a simple heuristic to
also record all potential string array references by pointers.
3.2.1. Hardware and Software for Development. A computer built with
an Intel Core2Duo E6400 processor (with Intel VT-x) and 1GB of DDR2 RAM was
used during both development of EtherAnnotate and the further analysis provided
in Section 4. The Debian Lenny 5.0 Linux distribution was installed as the Dom0
operating system running on top of Xen 3.1. Finally, Xen Ether 0.1 was installed
via the official instructions2 with a Windows XP SP2 DomU guest used for analysis
which was allocated 256MB of RAM.
3.2.2. Retrieving Instruction Trace from Malware Sample. The goal of
the Xen portion of EtherAnnotate is to single step a single virtualized guest program
and record the register values during each instruction. In order to enable single
stepping of a processor, the x86 architecture provides a single bit Trap Flag (TF)
that can be set in the FLAGS register. The FLAGS register is a status register on
x86 processors that contains various bit-flags that control or describe the state of
the processor. If the Trap Flag is set to true then the processor will make a call
to interrupt 1 (INT 1) after each instruction is executed. This interrupt is typically
used by kernel debuggers which would set this flag on the physical processor when
running in a bare-metal environment. In the Xen virtualization environment however,
the hypervisor creates a Virtual-Machine Control Structure (VMCS) for each virtual
processor of each virtual machine. The VMCS is a structure defined in the Intel VT-x
documentation that the hardware virtualization extensions use to store the state of
each virtual processor. In addition to virtual registers and flags that the hardware
processor has, the VMCS contains VM-specific control fields to set which operations
should trap into the hypervisor, where the processor should start executing during
a VM-exit exception, and metadata about the cause of a VM-exit [25]. The Xen
hypervisor can trap on specific interrupts and has been modified by Ether to allow
analysis code to be run while the virtual processor is paused at each instruction.
The process that Ether uses to enable single stepping of a virtual guest is pre-
sented in Figure 3.2. The code flow originates in the original Xen hypervisor, specifi-
cally the call to vmx properly set trap flag() which is normally used by Xen to properly
2http://ether.gtisc.gatech.edu/source.html (released April, 2009)
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handle returning execution to the guest during a VM-enter. If single stepping was
selected during the Ether configuration, then the original Xen code diverges into a
section which sets the Trap Flag for the virtual processor and also sets the VMCS
exception bitmap such that the Xen hypervisor will trap on the next exception. This
causes the guest to return, execute a single instruction which triggers an INT 1 ex-
ception due to the Trap Flag being set, and the Xen hypervisor catches this exception
and sends code execution to vmx handle debug exception(). Still inside the Xen hy-
pervisor (code modified by Ether), the code receives the debug exception (which
signifies interrupt 1 was triggered) and if Ether has enabled single stepping then it
makes a call to the next Xen Ether hypervisor function, ether handle instruction().
It is in this instruction handler that the Xen hypervisor finally gives control to the
Ether Dom0 code by sending an ETHER NOTIFY INSTRUCTION message to the
Dom0 code via a shared memory page. In the Ether main loop (and code section
where EtherAnnotate modifications were made), the program awaits messages sent
from the hypervisor - when an ETHER NOTIFY INSTRUCTION message arrives,
it calls a final function named disasm instruction() which handles the disassembly of
a virtual guest’s current instruction.
The previous actions were required in order to force the virtual guest operating
system to essentially pause after each instruction it executes, allowing the Ether-
Annotate code to execute and analyze the virtual guest’s state while it is paused.
Figure 3.3 continues where Figure 3.2 ended and describes the data and code flow
used to parse individual machine instructions and capture the register and memory
values. First, an additional step is required before vmx handle debug exception() is
called; the EtherAnnotate algorithm does not need to see all instructions executed
on a virtual processor but is only interested in viewing the instructions executed by
a single process within the virtual guest. When the user executes the EtherAnno-
tate analysis program, one of the command arguments is the malware filename, Nm,
which the user wishes to filter by. Every operating system uses its own method for
loading a process into memory and executing it and fortunately the Ether developers
determined how Windows XP SP2 loads processes and can determine the current
executing process by filename. Once Ether detects that Windows has switched to a
process whose filename matches the filter provided by the user, Ether will determine
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Figure 3.3. Control and Data flow during an EtherAnnotate Call
the value of Control Register 3 (CR3), CR3m and instruct the hypervisor to trap
whenever CR3’s value is changed to CR3m. This is useful since CR3 is a processor
register (virtualized to the guest) used for virtual memory addressing and always
contains the page directory base register (PDBR) which is unique for each process on
an operating system [26]. Therefore, if another process Px with the same filename as
the malware (Nx = Nm) is executed after the malicious program Pm has started then
Ether will only single step execution for Pm since ∀x,CR3x 6= CR3m.
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At this point, Ether has enabled single stepping for a specific malware process
based on a filename argument provided by the end-user and the guest is paused for
analysis. The Ether code originally called disasm instruction() which would use lib-
disasm3 to parse the x86 opcode into a human-readable string and log the disassmbled
instruction to a file. EtherAnnotate modifies this section of code to also record the
values of all registers which appear in the operands of the instruction and also fol-
low pointer values to possible strings in memory. Algorithm 1 describes the process
that EtherAnnotate uses to log instruction register values and the potential string
arrays that the reference values point to in memory. Ether already uses libdisasm’s
x86 disasm() function to generate a structure containing all information about each
instruction, so Algorithm 1 begins after this call. For each trapped instruction of the
guest operating system, EtherAnnotate first uses the libdisasm library to parse the
instruction’s operation code (opcode, the raw binary language a processor interprets)
and determine if one of the x86 general registers is used - EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX,
ESP, EBP, EDI, or ESI. Next, for each operand om that contains a register value, the
value of that register is stored into val by accessing internal Xen state structures for
the virtual machine under analysis. If val is of non-zero value, then the code proceeds
in an attempt to treat om as a pointer and find the value of the memory it references.
To do this, a call is made to the internal Xen function domain read current(val) which
does a mapping from the virtual machine’s virtual memory into the host machine’s
virtual memory and returns the value stored at the address val. Next, the algorithm
uses a basic heuristic to determine if the register in om is pointing to a string array
(run-time strings will be useful in analysis) by searching for ASCII characters. The
current value in memory that the pointer points to is checked to see if it is within
the printable ASCII characters (0x20 to 0x7F); if it is, then the value is copied into
a buffer, the address is incremented by one byte, and the loop repeats. Once either
a predefined maximum number of characters have been copied from the string or a
non-ASCII character is reached then the loop completes and all processing for the




ALGORITHM 1 Register and C String Array Logging
var: string[MAX SIZE] {Limited to 32 bytes in prototype}
var: ∀i, regi ∈ Σ
var: Λ = all printable ASCII characters
for instruction Im in Pm do
for operand om in Im do
if om ∈ Σ then
val = xen state.register values[om] {Store value of all registers used in
operands}
if val 6= 0 then
ptr val = domain read current(val) {If value is not null, assume it’s a
pointer and load memory at value}
j = 1
while ptr val[j] ∈ Λ and j < MAX SIZE do
string[j] = ptr val[j] {If memory value contains ASCII characters,
store them in a buffer}





print Im : (∀i, om) : (∀j, ptr valj : string[j]) {Log all register values and their
possible string references for each instruction}
end for
The worst-case runtime complexity of this algorithm is O(IRS) where I is the
total number of instructions that are traced, R is the average number of operands
containing register values per instruction, and S is the maximum string length con-
straint set by the analyst. Ether already requires O(I) time to single-step and perform
an instruction trace and EtherAnnotate adds to Ether’s instruction trace runtime by
O(RS). The x86 instruction set only contains instructions with a possible zero to three
operands, so in the worst-case scenario all instructions will contain three operands -
all of which contain register values (extremely unlikely). Therefore, the worst-case
runtime complexity that EtherAnnotate adds to the previous Ether instruction trace
operation is O(3S). Realistically, the call to domain read current() takes the most
amount of additional time since it requires a hypercall into the Xen hypervisor and
must wait for data to be returned.
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Table 3.1. Performance Analysis Between Ether Tracing and EtherAnnotate Tracing
Ether Size EA Size Ether Time EA Time
calc.exe 932 KB 2,221 KB 260.4s 253.8s
iexpress.exe 804 KB 2,003 KB 84.3s 84.9s
winmine.exe 364 KB 815 KB 64.3s 65.2s
notepad.exe 146 KB 414 KB 73.1s 76.2s
ipconfig.exe 262 KB 656 KB 111.4s 117.8s
SpyEye.exe 127,593 KB 347,358 KB 268.2 296.4
To examine the experimental performance of EtherAnnotate’s additions to the
Xen Ether code, multiple binaries were traced using each system and the amount of
time taken was recorded. Since Xen EtherAnnotate’s instruction tracer runs indepen-
dently from the virtual machine (can not induce programs to be executed inside of
the guest), the best method for recording the time taken was to start the timer with
the launch of EtherAnnotate then manually start the program to be traced in the
guest. This timing method is not particularly accurate, but should can at least give
an estimate to the amount of overhead incurred by the EtherAnnotate code additions.
Since each timing had to be completed manually, each program was just run once with
the timer for each condition - tracing with Ether and tracing with EtherAnnotate.
Additionally, the size of the trace files created by both Ether and EtherAnnotate
are compared in order to present the storage overhead of using EtherAnnotate. The
timing and storage comparisons are shown in Table 3.1. The percentage increases
incurred on the storage and time requirements for using EtherAnnotate are displayed
in Table 3.2. Finally, the percentage increases are visualized in Figure 3.4 as well as
the best linear fit equation for the data.
3.2.3. Retrieving Memory Values During Execution. For each operand
that contains a general purpose register, the EtherAnnotate code parses Xen’s internal
structure for the virtual machine under analysis and stores the current value of the
register used in the operand. If the register’s value is 0, then no further action is taken
for that specific operand (this is a simple heuristic to determine if a register has a
useful value). The algorithm next assumes that whatever value the register holds
could potentially be a pointer to a string array. A call to domain read current(val) is
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Table 3.2. Percentage Difference in Time and Speed of Ether and EtherAnnotate








made which is an internal Xen function that maps a guest domain’s virtual memory
address into the host machine’s physical memory address and allows EtherAnnotate
to read memory at a specific location in the guest. If register holds a pointer value
to a location in the guest’s memory which contains printable ASCII characters, then
the string array is copied out of memory into a buffer until either a non-printable
ASCII character is reached or 32 bytes have been copied (the static size limit was
an implementation limitation and not a limitation of the methodology). Finally, the
instruction mnemonic, the values of registers referenced in the instruction operands,
and any possible string arrays pointed to are logged into a text file for each instruction
in the malware’s trace.
3.3. IDA PRO ANNOTATION PLUGIN
While logging all register values and potential string values of a malicious pro-
gram during its runtime may be useful for analysis, a graphical representation of
this data would provide a significantly more useful tool to the malware analyst. The
EtherAnnotate IDA Pro plug-in provides a simple method for loading a custom Ether-
Annotate instruction trace and annotating disassembled instructions with their run-
time values in a meaningful graphical representation. The IDA Pro Disassembler4 is
one of the most popular and robust software disassembler tools available to malware
analysts. In addition to providing a disassembler for many common processor archi-
tectures, the IDA Pro application has a Software Development Kit (SDK) that can
be used to build plug-ins that are able to access and manipulate many of the internal
































Linear Fit Y(X) = A*X+B, A=0.13, B=-16.6
Figure 3.4. Correlation of the Percent Increase of Filesize and Runtime using Ether-
Annotate
and GUI aspects of IDA Pro. The SDK provided by the original developers requires
the plug-in developer to write their plug-in in the C language and recompile their
code for each revision.
3.3.1. IDA Python Development Environment. During EtherAnno-
tate’s development, the formatting and information stored in the log files from Xen
Ether changed as new design ideas emerged and thus was more pragmatic to use an
SDK better suited for rapid, agile development. Fortunately, a developer for the F-
Secure security company named Gergely Erde´lyi published an extension of the official
IDA Pro SDK, named IDAPython5, which uses the Python language and provides all
5http://d-dome.net/idapython/ (last updated July, 2009)
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of the original functionality of the IDA Pro SDK in a scripting language which favors
rapid prototyping.
3.3.2. Enhancements to IDA Disassemblies. The goal of EtherAn-
notate’s IDA Pro enhancements was to provide malware analysts with strategically
targeted run-time register and memory values in a easily comprehensible graphical
addition. The first half of this research’s approach creates comment annotations for
all disassembled instructions which are listed in a corresponding Xen EtherAnnotate
trace log. For each instruction listed in the log file from the Xen-side, the IDA Pro
plug-in uses regular expression pattern matching to store the instruction mnemonic
string, the address in code memory of the instruction, and any annotations for that
instruction that were recorded by EtherAnnotate. Then, for each annotation found,
a comment is added or amended to the address location in IDA Pro with the contents
of the annotation. An example of the annotations taken from a sample malware’s
decryption routine is presented in Figure 3.5. In this figure, only the potential string
array values are displayed and from these it appears that the code is incrementally
decoding various strings each time the section is called. The lines of instructions that
are highlighted in green are instructions that were executed during the EtherAnno-
tate trace, the instructions with a white background were not executed during the
trace.
The second half of the EtherAnnotate IDA Pro plug-in consists of a simple
method for conveying code coverage in IDA’s graph layout mode. For each instruction
that the malware executed during analysis under Xen EtherAnnotate, the address of
that instruction is located in IDA Pro’s disassembly and the background of that line
is colored such that a quick analysis of the code will make the code flow path obvious.
Finally, Algorithm 2 provides an overview of the IDA Pro plug-in’s actions taken to
annotate all instructions and render colorized code coverage.
The runtime complexity of the annotation algorithm is only O(IA) where I
is the total number of instructions in the trace file and A is the average number
of annotations per instruction file. Each instruction can have a maximum of three
operands (see Section 3.2.2), and in the worst-case each of these operands will also






Figure 3.5. Example of Annotated Instructions during a Decryption Routine
per line (3 register values, and 3 string values). Therefore, the worst-case runtime of
the annotation algorithm is linear in O(6I).
3.4. IMPROVEMENTS MADE DURING CASE STUDIES
At the start of the second case study of this thesis (Section 5), the author’s goal
was to find a popular malicious binary that detects and evades common dynamic
analysis tools. As it turned out, one of the core challenges in front of this goal
was the lack of speed that EtherAnnotate that truly manifested during analysis of
complex malware that requires many instructions to execute. This issue had been
known on the Xen-side since early development and was caused by an unknown bug
with the interaction between EtherAnnotate and Xen. Once the speed bug was fixed
as described in Section 3.4.1, it was then apparent that the IDA Pro EtherAnnotate
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ALGORITHM 2 Annotation and Code Coverage Visualization
trace file = LOAD(malware.trace)
for Line L in trace file do
instruction string = regular expression match
instruction address = regular expression match
annotations = regular expression match
SetColor(instruction address, GREEN)




plug-in was also too slow for effective malware analysis - the IDA Pro speed increases
are described in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1. Xen EtherAnnotate Speed Increases. From almost the begin-
ning of development EtherAnnotate’s development the tool would analyze the same
instructions many times in a row instead of just once each like they were actually
executed. The trace file would contain each instruction repeated a variable number
of times, but almost always more than once, but the execution of the program in
the virtual machine would be consistent with execution while not tracing (instruc-
tions were only executed once in the virtual machine). Since EtherAnnotate would
cause Xen to trap each instruction multiple times, the execution of EtherAnnotate’s
instruction tracing function was many orders of magnitude slower than Ether’s orig-
inal instruction tracer. The reason of this issue was never discovered until when the
author was analyzing malware during the second case study.
Prior to the second case study, the slowness issue was assumed to be caused by
the addition of the domain read current() function to Ether’s original instruction
tracer. This was the only function used in EtherAnnotate that called into the inter-
nals of Xen and allows EtherAnnotate to retrieve the memory value at the address
contained in a register while the virtual machine is paused for each instruction. Since
smaller binary files were used during development and testing, a simple workaround
was designed which checked if the processor’s instruction pointer (EIP) had changed
since the last time Ether received an instruction trace event from Xen. If it was found
that the value of EIP had not changed from the previous instruction trace event,
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Ether would then return control to Xen and not execute EtherAnnotate’s code. This
workaround eliminated multiple instructions being recorded into the EtherAnnotate
trace files but did not eliminate the extreme speed decrease.
During the second case study, the culprit of this issue was discovered to be
the method that domain read current() uses to read memory from a Xen virtual
machine. The domain read current() function is located in the Ether userland
source file syscalls.c which simply redirects to another userland function call,
ether readguest(). The function domain read current() is located in the user-
land source file ether.c which sends a domctl message containing the address of
memory to retrieve, a buffer to store the value in, and the command XEN DOMCTL
ETHER READ GUEST. A domctl message is the system that Xen uses to allow userland
applications in Dom0 make command requests to the Xen hypervisor (a hypercall).
All of the Xen Ether domctl command handlers are located in the Xen hypervi-
sor source file /xen/common/domctl.c in the function do domctl(u domctl). This
function takes a domctl command and determines what actions should be taken and
what values returned to the caller based on a switch table of the domctl command
(XEN DOMCTL ETHER READ GUEST in this example). The key element of this function
that caused Xen to trap on the same instruction multiple times is that before the
switch table there is a call to domain pause(d) which pauses the current domain.
This call to pause the current domain is understandable since all of the original Xen
domctl commands would be used while the virtual machine is running (e.g., to check
the status of the virtual CPU). However, at this point in EtherAnnotate’s code the
virtual machine has already been paused since it is being single stepped through the
malicious binary’s execution. A second call to domain pause(d) while the virtual
machine is already paused has undefined behaviour and in this case appears to cause
the virtual machine to not step to its next instruction for a significant amount of
time.
In order to alleviate the problem found above, the /xen/common/domctl.c Xen
hypervisor function was patched so that the virtual machine will not be paused during
XEN DOMCTL ETHER READ GUEST domctl commands. An example of the runtime speed
up that this patch created is the SpyEye trojan used for the second case study. With
the original Xen EtherAnnotate code, this instruction trace would take three to four
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Figure 3.6. Area of Xen Ether Source Code Changed for Pausing
Figure 3.7. Area of Xen Ether Source Code Changed for Unpausing
hours until execution finished. After the patch, the trace would only require around
ten minutes until the SpyEye binary had finished execution. Figure 3.6 shows the
modifications made to create a conditional pause and Figure 3.7 shows the same
modification made for a conditional unpause.
3.4.2. IDA Pro EtherAnnotate Porting to C++. The original IDA
Pro EtherAnnotate plug-in described in Section 3.3 was developed in the IDAPython
API which is a wrapper API for the official IDA Pro C++ API. This decision made
sense during development since the trace file format was changing as the Xen-side
development progressed and Python provided native libraries for regular expressions
which were used to parse the input trace files. However, once larger traces were now
practical produce with the significantly faster Xen EtherAnnotate tool, these trace
files were too large to be processed in a timely manner with the IDAPython plug-in.
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For example, an EtherAnnotate trace of the Conficker.C worm was over 10GB and
only took a matter of minutes to generate with Xen EtherAnnotate. However, a
similar trace file from the SpyEye trojan was 700MB and did not finish after being
run for over 12 hours with the IDAPython plug-in. Clearly, processing a 10GB would
take a significantly longer (although linarly) amount of time when a 700MB trace
taking 12 hours is already too long to be practical for analysis.
The Python language is an interpreted language which is inherently slower than
compiled languages such as C or C++. Additionally, the IDAPython library is a wrap-
per around the IDA Pro C++ API which means that an API call to the IDAPython
library must be parsed by IDAPython first and then sent to the native C++ API.
Because of these two traits of IDAPython, it was decided that porting the Ether-
Annotate plug-in to the native C++ API would be the best tactic for increasing
processing speeds. A direct port of Algorithm 2 was first attempted using the Boost6
regular expression library for C++ to accomodate the regular expression portions of
the original Python plug-in. As the port developed, it was discovered that including
the Boost regular expression matching calls significantly increased the runtime of the
C++ plug-in and even sometimes eclipsed the Python plug-in’s runtime. Therefore,
the Boost library regular expression calls were removed and the algorithm was opti-
mized to only use the C++ native string functions to parse each line of the trace log
file. The final C++ plug-in runtimes for parsing EtherAnnotate instruction trace files
was found to be significantly faster than the original IDAPython plug-in. The previ-
ous example of the SpyEye Trojan’s 700MB trace which did not complete execution
after 12 hours now finishes in under 10 minutes.
6http://www.boost.org/ (last updated February, 2010)
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4. CASE STUDY OF MEGAD BOTNET DROPPER
This section presents a case study performed to analyze a malicious botnet
binary file with the new EtherAnnotate tool developed in this thesis. Section 4.1
gives a detailed analysis of the malware following the same steps as during the actual
case study. Section 4.2 reports on the findings of the analysis, including the actions
that the malware takes, the goals of each section of the code, and how the annotated
instruction traces and code coverage indicators helped analysis.
4.1. MALWARE ANALYSIS USING ANNOTATED TRACING
The analysis performed in this section is analogous to what a computer security
lab would complete when analyzing newly seen malware. A sample malware binary
labeled as the MegaD botnet7 was downloaded from the Offensive Computing8 repos-
itory which stores live malware that other users have found. Once the sample was
retrieved, it was loaded onto a Windows XP SP2 Xen image with the EtherAnnotate
framework installed. The sample was executed once with the annotated instruction
tracing tool recording all instructions that were executed and all register values during
the execution. Afterward, the Xen image was restored to a clean state and the mal-
ware was again loaded onto the image. The sample was executed a second time while
the Ether automatic unpacking tool monitored and stored any layers of unpacking
that appeared.
After running the MegaD sample through the annotated instruction trace tool
and the Ether unpacking tool, an instruction trace file and a single unpacked layer
binary were now available to help static analysis. The unpacked binary can be loaded
into the IDA Pro disassembler and the IDA Python EtherAnnotate plug-in will an-
notate all instructions using the trace file previously generated as shown earlier in
Figure 3.5.
4.1.1. Part I - Loading Functions. After loading the annotated binary
into IDA, it appears that the first part of the code is a large loop from visual inspec-
tion of the code coverage in Figure 4.1. Further inspection of the actual instruction
7MD5: 5AFEB6643C8E1A83A3B32908F3921829
8http://offensivecomputing.net/ (accessed March, 2010)
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trace confirms that the first 99.9% of the instructions executed are related to this
loop (most likely a code decryption routine which is decrypting code for the final
0.1% of instructions executed). It was discovered during this case study that either
IDA Python or the annotation plug-in cannot handle extremely large trace files (this
particular file contains over 2.7 million executed instructions) so the trace had to be
divided into the last 0.1% in order to properly annotate the rest of the code. The
large box at the bottom of Figure 4.1 is where the code jumps to after it has fin-
ished the main loop; Figure 4.2 presents the final lines of the loop in more detail.
Further analysis using OllyDbg helped determine that this initial decryption loop is
part of the publicly available Ultimate Packer for eXecutables (UPX) program which
compresses and obfuscates binary executables9.
So far, the code coverage and instruction trace have been used to quickly find
that the MegaD binary executes a relatively small loop a very large number of times
and finally jumps to a separate section of code once it has finished. At the current
analysis location in Figure 4.2, it appears that the code pushes seven sets of addresses
to the stack and then jumps to another location in memory (an import address of
a system call in the import table). After further analysis of this particular binary,
it turns out that this is a common method for calling a new function, possibly to
obfuscate the call, and is described in more detail in Section 4.2.2.
Since the Ether unpacking tool does a raw dump of a process from memory as it
is executing, it does not obtain a properly formatted PE executable formated binary.
One side-effect of this is that the table of imported system functions contained inside
of every PE file is not properly referenced or formatted. While IDA Pro will usually
annotate imported function names with their arguments (which helps the malware
analyst), it is necessary to manually rename imported functions to their Windows
system call names in IDA when using an Ether dump. The names associated with
function addresses can be found online10 and an example of how IDA appears before
and after are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.
Once all of the initial clean-up and analysis is done in IDA Pro, the analysis
process can start to look at the decrypted functions that are now run by the malware
9http://upx.sourceforge.net/ (last updated September, 2009)
10http://www.newsvoter.com/Binary/dll/index.html (accessed March, 2010)
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Figure 4.1. The initial decryption loop of MegaD
Figure 4.2. Final lines of decryption routine and jump to malicious code
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Figure 4.3. Example of the Unpacked Import Table
Figure 4.4. Jump Sequence after Imports have been Fixed
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and see if the annotations from EtherAnnotate assist in the investigation. The first
action that the MegaD binary takes after decryption is to call the Windows system
function GetVersionEx which returns operating system version information into an
OSVERSIONINFO struct 11. This is a fairly common method that malware uses
to determine what version of the Windows OS it is running on (9x, XP, or Vista/7
mostly) and is needed in order to properly load some functions and DLLs later. The
next section of code is displayed in Figure 4.5 and uses various MMX registers and
MMX-based instructions to decrypt and store the string “kernel32.dll” into the EDX
register and push it onto the stack. First, the MMX instruction set is an extension to
the x86 instruction set and provides registers and instructions designed to efficiently
handle certain floating point operations [26]. The code here appears to be converting
integer values from the standard registers into floating point values, manipulating
them, and then converting back to integer values in the standard registers. Second,
the annotations provided in this code section make it much more obvious that the
goal of this sequence of instructions is to stealthily load a known DLL’s filename out
of memory. A non-malicious program would have typically done a simple direct load
of a character string’s address which would have been easily traceable in a debugger
(which is not what this malware author wanted). Finally, like the jump sequence
mentioned above, this pattern of loading a DLL filename string out of memory using
floating point manipulation will occur throughout the rest of this part of the malware.
After the first code section, further analysis of the next few sections shows
that the code follows a pattern of loading function name strings and calling GetPro-
cAddress12. GetProcAddress is another Windows system function commonly seen in
malware along with LoadLibrary13; it retrieves the address of an exported function
from a DLL and returns the address. Figure 4.6 shows a zoomed out graph view of
the rest of this part of code - each green code block contains MMX-based code to
load a function name string, call GetProcAddress, and continue to the next block to
the right. Again, the annotations in each code block provide the exact function name
being loaded that would otherwise be obfuscated by the floating point operations.
11http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms724451(VS.85).aspx (accessed Mar., 2010)
12http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms683212(VS.85).aspx (accessed Mar., 2010)
13http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms684175(VS.85).aspx (accessed Mar., 2010)
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Figure 4.5. Using MMX Registers and Instructions to Load Strings
After all of the needed functions have been loaded with the above technique,
the malware finally jumps to a new section, performs a few checks, and finally pushes
ResumeThread onto the stack to be called on return and then returns. It appears
that the code has potentially been injected into a system application, paused the
system application’s actual code flow, loaded its own functionality into the system
application, and resume execution of the host application. This is a common technique
of malware and is similar to parasitic relationships among organic creatures where
the malicious code hides in the host application and subtly manipulates its actions.
4.1.2. Part II - Decryption and File Dropping. The final section of the
MegaD malware decrypts a section of memory and drops the decrypted data into a
.bat file for execution. The first goal of this section is to retrieve the current path
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Figure 4.6. Load all needed DLL exported functions.
Figure 4.7. Portion of code generating the BAT filename from the current process’s
filename
of the running application, which the malware achieves by calling the GetSystemDi-
rectoryA function (again, this is only known due to the annotation of the string as
it is stored in a register). Next, the code jumps around without calling too many
functions but appears to be allocating memory on the heap using the VirtualAlloc
Windows system call - this will be useful when combined with the actions found
further in the code. Eventually, both the filename and path of the current process
is determined and put into the canonical Windows path format (no slashes, colons,
or other symbols ommitted). The annotations are particularly useful in the function
shown in Figure 4.7 where it appears that the filename of the original program is used
to generate the filename of the .bat file that will be dropped.
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Figure 4.8. The arguments being passed to CreateFileA. Arithmetic operations on
register values is currently not supported.
The final section of this malware consists of a long sequence of instructions,
starting with a CreateFile function call followed by many WriteFile calls and ending
with a CloseHandle call. The CreateFile function call in Figure 4.8 demonstrates how
the current implementation of EtherAnnotate lacks the ability to parse certain register
values. The final PUSH instruction uses arithmetic operations on a register value
before being referenced; the annotation code cannot currently parse this operation
and therefore there is no annotation for this line. It would have been quite useful
to know the filename being written to, along with other variables throughout the
code, but it can be deduced from the previous sections that it will be a .bat filename
generated in the previous section. The WriteFile calls write multiple data buffers
into the file, followed by DOS batch commands such as “goto”, “if exists”, and “del”.
Without further analysis outside of the IDA Pro disassembly, the author was not able
to determine exactly what this batch file would perform on execution. After the file
handle has been closed, the malware calls ExitProcess and the instruction trace ends.
4.2. REVIEW OF FINDINGS
From the analysis in the previous section, it was determined that this malicious
binary’s goal is to inject itself into another executing process, inconspicuously load
required DLLs and functions, create a new file based on some sort of hash of the
original filename, and write decrypted binary data into this batch file. Much of this
investigation’s results come from standard reverse engineering analysis techniques,
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but the inclusion of runtime register values in the annotations made some of the
more complicated analysis much easier.
4.2.1. Benefits of Annotation and Code Coverage. The benefits of
adding code coverage to the EtherAnnotate IDA Pro plugin are the most immediately
realized, especially in this example. At the beginning of the case study in Section 4.1.1,
it was found that the malware checks which version of Windows it is running on and
diverts into one of three code paths from there on out. As it turns out, it can
be determined by visual analysis of which code sections have been colored green
that the vast majority of instructions in this binary were not executed during the
EtherAnnotate trace. Therefore, much of the code disassembled by IDA Pro can be
ignored during a quick analysis since it is visually indicated that the program never
executed those instructions.
The advantages of having register-value annotations in IDA Pro were touched on
during the previous section’s analysis. In this example with MegaD, the best example
was how the annotation captured the function and DLL name strings that were being
loaded through obfuscated means. Without the annotation, these values would have
been extremely hard to determine since they were not stored in plaintext in the binary.
An alternative method to figure out the values would be to run dynamic analysis tools
on the binary (such as ProcMon or Process Explorer) which can determine what
exported DLL functions a program loads during runtime. However, these dynamic
analysis tools only help determine values that are used during a system call while the
program is executing, whereas the EtherAnnotate plug-in captures all string values of
registers during any instruction. While testing EtherAnnotate with other malicious
binaries, decryption of botnet messages and connection commands have been noticed
in the annotations which could aid reverse engineering the protocol of new botnets.
4.2.2. The Mysterious Jump Signature. Before touching on the limits
of the current EtherAnnotate tool, a short analysis of the jump signature first seen
in Figure 4.2 may provide more insight on how the malware obfuscates its code.
Figure 4.9 provides an example of what a standard call and return instruction se-
quence typically look like in C-compiled programs. Typically, function arguments are
pushed onto the stack prior to a function call; when the instruction pointer jumps to
the function code, it accesses these values on the stack as its arguments. Likewise, a
46
Figure 4.9. Example of a call instruction and return instruction in calc.exe
function typically terminates and returns code flow back to its caller by executing a
retn instruction. The processor determines where to set the instruction pointer after
the retn statement by checking the top value on the stack, or the address in ESP [33].
However, in the MegaD code, almost all functional blocks of instructions have the
jump sequence in Figure 4.2 where a number of pushes are made followed by a single
jump instruction.
It turns out that this obfuscation technique first jumps to the final location
specified in the actual jmp instruction and then uses the mechanisms of the retn
instruction to sequentially call all of the other values pushed onto the stack. When
each call to each pushed address reaches its final instruction and is ready to return, the
return value on the stack is always the previously pushed address in the original code
section. For example, in Figure 4.2 the sequence of calls made is GetCurrentProcess
(initial jmp), GetTickCount, 0x40C2B4 (jumps to GetCurrentThread), GetLastError,
GetCommandLineA, and finally an address labeled “start” during prior analysis.
Since the results of each call are not pushed to the stack before calling the next
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function, it appears that this jump signature is purely an obfuscation and that the
first legitimate call is the local address towards the beginning of the signature.
4.2.3. Limitations of EtherAnnotate Analysis. Although the Ether-
Annotate provides valuable, new information about what string values registers hold
during runtime, there are some situations that the plugin currently does not handle.
The situations where EtherAnnotate currently cannot resolve the data stored in a
memory location can be separated into two instruction operand categories: complex
register referencing and direct memory access. Complex register referencing encom-
passes all instructions with operands where the registers are not directly referenced
(e.g., MOV [EAX+EBP], 0x05 would be a complex register reference). This analysis
deficit is purely implementation-specific and can be resolved by adding extra function-
ality to the Xen-side of the EtherAnnotate plug-in that will recognize more libdisasm
disassembly operands. Similarly, direct memory access encompasses all instructions
with operands that refer to memory addresses instead of processor registers (e.g., PUSH
DS:[0x432C03]). These instructions may or may not have additional operands that
are registers, but they all directly access a memory location without going through
a register. Like the complex register referencing, additional functionality would need
to be added to handle the libdisasm parsing for direct memory access. Additionally,
since the current plug-in only pulls register data from Xen, more functionality would
have to be added to map the Xen virtual machine’s virtual memory into the actual
host memory. This would allow the EtherAnnotate plug-in to directly access what
value is stored at that address.
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5. CASE STUDY OF SPYEYE CYBERCRIME TROJAN
This section presents a second case study, focusing on how analysis using Ether-
Annotate compares to current dynamic and static analysis tools. The target of this
case study is a binary created by the cybercrime software toolkit (crimeware) called
SpyEye. The SpyEye toolkit is sold for $500 on Russian underground forums and
allows an attacker to build a custom Trojan bot that can capture a wide array of
personal information once installed on a victim’s computer and send the information
back to a central server [2]. Section 5.1 describes the process used to decide to evaluate
EtherAnnotate on the SpyEye Trojan and why the other candidate malware were not
able to be analyzed. Section 5.2 summarizes the previous reverse engineering work
done on SpyEye by security labs and researchers and Section 5.3 presents the new
analysis using EtherAnnotate. Finally, Section 5.4 gives a study of EtherAnnotate’s
benefits compared to the other commonly used malware analysis tools.
5.1. FINDING A MALICIOUS BINARY FOR COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
The goal of this case study was to show the benefits and differences of the
EtherAnnotate analysis tool compared to other commonly used static and dynamic
analysis tools. The majority of reverse engineering information on malicious software
is located on security labs’ websites and blogs as well as on a few various Internet
forums focused on malware analysis and reverse engineering. One especially useful
site for finding malware to study is an online malicious binary repository hosted
on Offensive Computing14 as well as a forum for discussing malware and requesting
samples. On this site, a security researcher can search by a file’s hash, filename, or
anti-virus signature name to find over a million different malicious binaries stored on
their servers. However, finding a malicious file that executes easily (e.g., does not need
a server to be up, does not inject into other processes, etc...) and behaves in ways
to hinder analysis is not a simple challenge. The search for a binary for the second
14http://offensivecomputing.net/
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case study was narrowed down to a botnet by the name Conficker and a crimeware
Trojan named SpyEye, which their variants are described as:
• Conficker.A: The first version of the Conficker worm, runs as an EXE file but
did not perform noticeable malicious activity.
• Conficker.C: A later version of Conficker that uses P2P communication, does
not allow dynamic analysis tools to run and is a DLL that needs to be started
as a service.
• SpyEye: - A new crimeware Trojan EXE that spawns a remote thread in
explorer.exe and then communicates back to a command & control server.
The Conficker.A worm, released in early 2009, was the first that the author
looked at as a candidate because of the large amount of previous research done on
Conficker and its variants [34]. However, after running the sample15 in both a VMware
sandbox and inside of Xen EtherAnnotate, neither environment showed evidence that
the worm was behaving maliciously. This was deduced by looking at Wireshark
network traces, Process Monitor output, RegShot output, and the EtherAnnotate
trace file. Additionally, even after the Conficker.A variant had been unpacked from
its original UPX packing, the EtherAnnotate trace file was over 10GB which was
deemed to be too large for practical analysis in the IDA Pro plug-in (this was before
the plug-in was ported to C++ as described in Section 3.4.2).
The next candidate malware that was examined was the Conficker.C vari-
ant, also released in 2009, since there was a relatively large amount of previous
research on its behavior as well [35]. The Conficker.C variant was delivered as a
DLL library16 instead of an executable file and was designed to be dropped into
the C:\Windows\System32 directory and loaded as a service. The Ether instruc-
tion tracer was not designed specifically for tracing DLL files since their execution
trace comes from another program loading the DLL into memory and calling its
functions, but attempts were made by the author to allow for DLL tracing. The




DLL file into the System32 directory, changing a non-essential service’s (Network
Location Awareness) configuration in the Windows Registry to point to the new
Conficker DLL, and rebooting the virtual machine. Upon restart, the worm would
attempt to contact command & control servers as seen in Wireshark network trace
logs and would cause dynamic analysis programs such as Process Monitor and Process
Explorer to automatically close upon execution. However, the Conficker.C’s execu-
tion was unable to be traced in this method since Windows uses the svchost.exe
executable to load multiple Windows services DLLs - tracing svchost.exe would
produce a trace containing interleaved execution of all services running under that
process. Two workarounds were designed that allowed a single service to be run-
ning under an instance of the svchost.exe binary; however, the Conficker.C DLL
would load under neither of these workarounds. The first workaround consists of
changing the value in the Windows registry for the non-essential service such that
it loads the DLL with a renamed copy of svchost.exe instead of the original.
By changing the value of \HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<Service
Name>\ImagePath to point to the renamed copy of svchost.exe instead of the orig-
inal path. This modification will cause the service to load the Conficker.C DLL at
startup and will be loaded by its own, personal instance of svchost.exe. The second
workaround consists of creating a new service group that only contains the Con-
ficker.C DLL service which causes one of the instances of svchost.exe to be running
only the Conficker.C code [36]. Both of these workaround require the TimeoutPeriod
value to be added to the registry as described in [37] so that the service does not
timeout while the process is being single-stepped.
These changes did allow for a benign services to be loaded by themselves and
traced, but the Conficker.C refused to be loaded when any of these changes were
made to the system. Further research would need to be done in order to determine
the best methods for tracing DLL services in Windows using the Xen Ether tracer
without modifying the underlying guest system.
The final malware candidate was the SpyEye Trojan which is a custom-built
binary file that can be generated by purchasing the SpyEye building software from
Russian sources. This file is an EXE executable and was able to run and cause
malicious behavior while under analysis although it only attempted to contact the
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Figure 5.1. A screenshot of the SpyEye Trojan builder [2]
command & control servers, which have been shut down, and then went dormant.
Additionally, although this Trojan has only been active since the beginning of 2010
there is a relatively large number of reverse engineering reports that focus mostly on
the builder but also on some of its communication [2][38][39]. Figure 5.1 provides a
sample screenshot of the SpyEye builder that an attacker would use to generate the
SpyEye Trojan that will be examined in this section. This thesis presents a new,
in-depth look into the actions of the SpyEye Trojan as it loads itself into memory
and checks for previous infections.
5.2. PREVIOUS ANALYSIS OF SPYEYE TROJAN
5.2.1. Trojan Installation. The Trojan is typically installed in the wild
using the TrojanDropper:Win32/Spyeye malicious binary that a user has been con-
vinced to execute on their system. This dropper binary connects to a server and
downloads the Trojan:Win32/Spyeye binary that will be analyzed in this section [40].
According to the Microsoft Malware Protection Center’s report on SpyEye, the mal-
ware installs itself in the %SystemDrive%\cleansweep.exe\ cleansweep.exe path
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and creates a mutex named “ CLEANSWEEP ” to guarantee that only one in-
stance of the Trojan is running at a time. Additionally, the Trojan creates a value in
the Windows registry that instructs the operating system to load cleansweep.exe on
system start-up and also injects itself into currently running processes.
5.2.2. Trojan Payload. Once the SpyEye malware has installed itself on the
system and injected itself into one of the processes currently running, it starts to take
actions to hide itself and steal sensitive user data. The Trojan manages to hide the
actual process by injecting itself into another process and executing there; the Trojan
hides its files and registry values by using rootkit techniques to hook low-level APIs
and modify the query results for files and registry values. The SpyEye binary uses
similar techniques to hook various system functions that handle HTTP traffic and
records login information such as form data and keystrokes. Finally, once the Trojan
has captured data, it will send the data to various command & control servers (most
likely the servers hosted by whoever built the Trojan using the SpyEye toolkit).
5.3. ETHERANNOTATE ANALYSIS OF SPYEYE TROJAN
The SpyEye Trojan binary that was analyzed using the EtherAnnotate toolset
was downloaded from the Offensive Computing repository17 and was packed with
the UPX packing software. Once this case study began, the author realized that
the current implementation of EtherAnnotate was too slow to finish in a practical
amount of time and key changes were made to both the Xen and IDA Pro aspects
of the toolset and are described in Section 3.4. The malware was initially unpacked
using QUnpack in order to reduce the size of the EtherAnnotate trace file and speed
up the IDA Pro annotations. However, after running the malware and looking at the
annotated disassembly in IDA Pro it became apparent that the malware is able to
detect that it had been modified and unpacked. Figure 5.2 shows the area in code
where this check occurs and it is apparent from the code coverage visualization that
instead of calling CreateRemoteThread() the code instead jumps past the call. The
call to CheckFileModifications shown in Figure 5.2 was renamed by the author during
analysis to help identify key areas of the disassembly and the internals of the function
consist of multiple calls to VirtualQueryEx(). VirtualQueryEx() is a Windows API
17MD5: 9d2a48be1a553984a4fda1a88ed4f8ee
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Figure 5.2. A screenshot of the SpyEye check for file modifications
function that retrieves information about pages within the virtual address space of the
specified process - in this case, it is examining its own pages for modifications. Upon
noticing this anti-analysis technique, the SpyEye Trojan was run through the Xen
EtherAnnotate tool without unpacking it first. The trace was loaded into IDA Pro
again and this time the code coverage visualization showed that the binary did not
jump around the CreateRemoteThread() call and instead made the call using values
from explorer.exe. Additionally, HTTP queries were noticed in the Wireshark logs to
the servers textttvinodelam.nett.cn and fw.ename.cn which match the description of
previous research [39].
54
5.3.1. Initialization and Anti-Tamper Checks. Once a trace was cre-
ated that followed the SpyEye malware through its malicious behavior, the trace was
loaded into IDA Pro using the EtherAnnotate C++ plug-in and its behavior was
analyzed. The malware first checks if there is already a system mutex with the name
“ CLEANSWEEP ”, as described in previous research, and jumps around the ma-
licious code if there is - system mutexes are commonly used by malware to leave their
fingerprint on infected machines. The core infection routine happens at 0x403754
and consists of modification of the file as described above, checks to make sure the
code is going to be injected into certain system files, and the CreateRemoteThread()
call that performs the injection. The code first grabs the name of the process in which
the code is executing and then goes through a series of calls to the string comparison
function lstrcmpiA() to check that the code is not going to be injected into certain
system files. Figure 5.3 shows a screenshot from IDA Pro with the EtherAnnotate
annotations during part of the system file check sequence.
5.3.2. Injection into Explorer.exe. The next key aspect of the ini-
tialization sequence is to find the base memory address of the process that SpyEye
wants to inject itself into. The code for this begins at 0x403469 and consists of
a call to VirtualQueryEx to retrieve the base address and then a loop which calls
WriteProcessMemory that copies the SpyEye payload into explorer.exe’s memory. If
the analyst takes notice to the values returned by VirtualQueryEx and the arguments
passed into WriteProcessMemory in Figure 5.4, it becomes apparent that the base
address for explorer.exe is 0x0e600000. This is important to notice since it confirms
that WriteProcessMemory is writing data from the SpyEye binary’s own memory into
a location in explorer.exe’s memory, but also confirms later that the call to CreateR-
emoteThread passes in a function from explorer.exe as the lpStartAddress argument.
Figure 5.5 shows the call to CreateRemoteThread with the EtherAnnotate reg-
ister value annotations as well as the function argument names added by the author.
From the previous realization that 0x0e600000 is the base address for explorer.exe and
that SpyEye wrote portions of its code to this process, it can be determined that the
lpStartAddress argument of 0x0ea6148a is the location of that copied code. Brows-
ing in IDA Pro to 0x0040148a in the SpyEye disassembly will reveal the instructions
that were copied into explorer.exe and executed under that process. However, since
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Figure 5.3. A screenshot of the SpyEye injection checks
the execution was carried out under the explorer.exe process and not the SpyEye.exe
process, EtherAnnotate is currently unable to trace those instructions since it does
process tracing by a filename and CR3 filter.
5.4. COMPARISON OF ANALYSIS TOOLS
The SpyEye Trojan was additionally analyzed using a variety of common analy-
sis tools and techniques to evaluate how EtherAnnotate compares in versatility. The
malware was loaded onto a Windows XP SP2 virtual machine along with an Ubuntu
Linux virtual machine in a VMware team. Running inside of a virtual machine was
required for these experiments in order to make containment of malicious behavior
easier and more reliable than running on bare-metal. The Linux virtual machine was
running Wireshark to monitor network traffic and was configured to act as the router
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Figure 5.4. A screenshot of SpyEye injecting its code into explorer.exe
for the Windows virtual machine. Additionally, the Linux guest was configured to
respond to all DNS requests with its own IP address instead of querying an actual
DNS server for the network. This DNS spoofing allows for network aliveness checks
in the Windows guest to at least succeed, making it appear that the host the guest
program is looking for is alive but not doing anything.
The first analysis experiment was to run the SpyEye Trojan on the Windows
guest with no analysis programs running. This was done to achieve a control group
(at least for network behavior) in case other analysis tools caused the SpyEye malware
to change its behavior. The Wireshark network trace was similar to that captured
during EtherAnnotate analysis; five identical POST requests and one GET request
are made to the vinodelam.nett.cn domain. The POST requests contain a sequence of
formatted messages containing bot identifiers, time zone information about the guest,
language information about the guest, and the Windows OS version of the guest. The
GET request appears to be a registration scheme for the command & control server;
it sends the ID of the guest, version information about programs on the guest, and
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Figure 5.5. A screenshot of SpyEye creating a new thread inside explorer.exe
a CRC identifier for the bot. These protocol exchanges were previously published in
the Microsoft Malware Protection Center report [40].
The second experiment was to run the SpyEye Trojan inside of the stock Olly-
Dbg debugger to determine if any anti-debugging mechanisms are present in SpyEye.
The Linux guest was running Wireshark as before and recorded another similar net-
work trace. From this experiment, it was deduced that the SpyEye binary does not
contain any obvious debugger detection mechanisms; although, the program was exe-
cuted without any breakpoints or single-stepping which can cause certain detections
to occur. For the third experiment, the SpyEye binary was loaded on the Windows
guest again and this time monitored using Process Monitor and Regshot, providing
information on event logging and registry changes respectively. The Process Mon-
itor results showed that SpyEye wrote two files, C:\cleansweep.exe\config.bin
and C:\cleansweep.exe\cleansweep.exe, and then suddenly explorer.exe process
executes the cleansweep.exe file. From the previous analysis with EtherAnnotate,
this event becomes clear that explorer.exe is performing malicious activity because
SpyEye did a code injection attack on the process. The files written to disk were
referenced in previously published analysis [40]. Regshot did not provide any registry
changes other than those typical of launching a program in Windows XP. Finally, the
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Figure 5.6. Snapshot of Wireshark Network Trace with Control Experiment
SpyEye binary was run through PEiD in order to see what signature identification
could be produced for the packer and PEiD reported that UPX 3.0 had been used.
Although there appear to be no anti-analysis techniques employed in the SpyEye
binary, the information that EtherAnnotate provides goes beyond the basic analy-
sis possible with previous tools. The EtherAnnotate trace could not follow beyond
the code injection into explorer.exe, but the annotations from before the injection
provided detailed information on how the malware behaved. The check for file con-
sistency was not apparent in the information provided by the previous tools and was
useful to determine the conditions in which SpyEye executes. Additionally, the pro-
cess for determining which process to inject, finding the base memory address of that
process, and injecting the code into memory allocated inside of the guest process are




6.1. PRESENTED SOLUTION TO MALWARE ANALYSIS PROBLEM
This thesis has described EtherAnnotate, a research tool for malicious software
security analysts which presents a merger of information gathered in dynamic analysis
and visualized in a static analysis disassembly view. By applying the EtherAnnotate
tool to a malicious binary program, a researcher is able to statically view what values
variables and memory addresses the program held during its actual runtime. Further
more, since EtherAnnotate’s tracing module is built upon the Xen Ether framework,
it is transparent to the execution of the malware for all anti-debugging attacks and
most anti-VM attacks. The insight that will be obtained by using this novel toolset
will hopefully allow future malware analysts to better detect and defend against the
increasingly advanced malicious attacks on computer systems.
6.2. STRENGTHS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
EtherAnnotate is unique in that it allows dynamic malware analysis that is com-
pletely undetectable by the common anti-debugging malware obfuscations. Because
the Ether framework has a higher privilege than both the guest kernel and guest
applications, EtherAnnotate can monitor any actions of malicious binaries without
the need to modify the state of the guest operating system. The only possible known
attacks against Ether and thus EtherAnnotate’s transparency are by detecting vir-
tualized devices and detecting timing inconsistencies. The properties and behavior
of the host system’s devices can be passed through to the guest or potentially emu-
lated by the hypervisor with additional implementation work. Local timing attacks
for virtualization detection can be subverted by utilizing the Intel VT-x TSC offset
which causes the guest’s virtual processor to return purposefully skewed clock time
in order to hide the additional time taken during VM-exits. Xen currently utilizes
the VT-x TSC offset feature, but checking the time using remote data is impossible
to easily detect or defend against. Since EtherAnnotate is transparent to the guest
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operating system in these ways, its presence as a tool in the malware analysts reper-
toire will force malware authors to fall back to anti-VM detection techniques that
rely on remote timing analysis in order to evade detection. However, using anti-VM
techniques is becoming less and less appealing to malware authors as more companies
and individuals start using virtual machines. A larger virtualization user-base elim-
inates a substantial number of possible adversarial targets since VM-detection only
detects that a VMM is present, not that analysis is occurring. This compromise and
restriction of available obfuscation actions of malicious binaries is one of the more
interesting and open areas of research in the virtualization introspection field.
EtherAnnotate’s integration of data collected during dynamic analysis with the
static disassembly generated by IDA Pro opens new possibilities for in-depth anal-
ysis. Previously, the most common method to visually inspect the run-time values
of a program with the disassembled instructions would be to run a trace of the pro-
gram using an application such as OllyDbg and stepping through each line of code
to see the values at each line. The tools presented in this thesis improve on previous
integration techniques in three ways: transparent tracing, visual trace annotations,
and heuristics for data recording. The transparent tracing benefits described in the
previous section provide the malware analyst with a guarantee that the malware un-
der analysis will have identical behavior inside of EtherAnnotate as it would on a
bare-metal environment (other than possible anti-VM detection). There are tools,
such as plug-ins for OllyDbg, which can guard against anti-debugging detection but
these previous tools can only defend against known techniques and are not guaranteed
to work in all cases - EtherAnnotate gives the analyst this guarantee. The closest
visual tracing tool currently available is probably IDA Pro’s recently added tracing
ability shown in Figure 6.1. The IDA Pro tracing functionality provides a record
of all instructions executed and a list of register values for all operands of these in-
structions. It does not follow register values to detect possible pointers to strings
and the IDA Pro debuggers do not have any defenses against anti-debugging attacks.
For example, the trace show in Figure 6.1 was from a benign program which utilized
many different anti-debugging techniques and crashed before unpacking itself by de-
tecting the breakpoints IDA Pro had set. Additionally, the IDA Pro trace appears in
a separate window from the actual disassembly and the end-user analyst must toggle
61
Figure 6.1. Example Instruction Trace from IDA Pro’s Debugger
between the two windows to correlate what the register values were at each instruc-
tion - having this information on a single window using EtherAnnotate’s comments
seems much more practical. Finally, the last major strength of EtherAnnotate is the
heuristic for determining run-time string values and visualizing them in the IDA Pro
disassembly. If a botnet binary is going to decrypt and encrypt data that it receives
and sends to its Command & Control server, EtherAnnotate can capture the plain-
text strings before being encrypted. A malware researcher analyzing the code can
follow the program’s flow using the colorized code coverage and use the annotations
provided to understand the botnet’s protocol and walk through how the encryption
algorithm works.
6.3. ISSUES THAT LIMIT USEFULNESS
Although EtherAnnotate provides many new opportunities to combine runtime
variable values with a graphical disassembly for better understanding of malware,
there are many areas of the toolset that can be improved for better usability and
better analysis. The first area for improvement is the overall speed of analysis - the
bug fix described in Section 3.4.1 and the port to C++ described in Section 3.4.2
tremenduously increased performance, but more can be done. After running many
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EtherAnnotate traces on different types of files, the author noticed that although
Ether starts to single-step immediately after a program is executed, the instruction
trace does not record anything for approximately the first minute. During this time,
it appears that the Windows executable loader code is allocating memory and initial-
izing data structures for the binary that is about to execute. Further research should
be done in determining the process that Windows uses to load an executable before
the code flow is handed off to the executable’s entry point - if this loading process
is what’s taking up time before a trace, it should not be single-stepped. In addition,
although some runtime performance analysis was recorded in Section 3.2.2, it would
be interesting to record more data more accurately in order to provide benchmarks
for future research.
One of the main limitations of EtherAnnotate for analysis purposes is the lack
of support for certain classes of instructions. Currently, the only instruction classes
that are supported for analysis are instructions that directly reference register names
(e.g., MOV EAX, EBX or PUSH ECX). This is due to the prototype implementation that
EtherAnnotate originated from and currently only does simple string parsing to de-
termine what registers are present in the instruction mnemonic. It should be fairly
easy to add support for all instruction classes, such as registers with mathematical
operations (e.g., MOV [EAX+0x4], ESP), in the future by creating more robust pars-
ing algorithms for the libdisasm mnemonics provided in Xen Ether. Additionally, the
current code only searches for values for CPU registers but many instructions directly
reference memory locations. However, it turns out that this is not a true limitation
since the x86 instruction set does not allow direct manipulation of memory values.
Memory values must first be loaded into a general purpose register, manipulated us-
ing this register, and then the result is stored back into a memory address. Because of
this process, only recording the register values will in fact capture all of the pertinent
data of the operations.
The limitation that was most obvious during this thesis’s case studies was that
the instruction tracing ability only works for a single process’s execution. This is not
a problem for most applications, but malware will often inject its code into a second
process and hide its continuing execution there. The SpyEye Trojan did exactly this
and hid its truly malicious activity inside of explorer.exe. A start to finding a usable
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solution to this problem would be to monitor system calls made by the process and
record the information passed to CreateRemoteThread class (or any other calls that
start code flow in a separate process). Once a call is made that spawns a thread or
process in a separate binary file, the injected process’s name can be recorded and a
separate EtherAnnotate trace could start on this process. Additionally, a memory
dump of the injected process would need to be made in order to obtain the executable
with the injected code intact. These additions to EtherAnnotate should not prove to
be too difficult since Ether provides methods for system call tracing and its unpacking
tool makes memory dumps of processes at runtime.
6.4. FUTURE WORK
EtherAnnotate is one of the first extensions to the Xen Ether framework which
will hopefully expand to provide more analysis tools in new areas that were not
previously possible. One of the areas which has the most potential for future research
is designing smarter heuristics for data collection during the Xen EtherAnnotate
trace algorithm. Currently, the algorithm simply checks if a register’s value points
to a character string array of ASCII printable bytes up to a certain length. During
design, research was started to determine what signature the memory allocation and
memory free Windows system calls leave on the memory they affect. Identifying the
structures left in around these memory allocations could help provide a more accurate
recognition of string values. However, compilers that do not follow the Microsoft
standards for string allocation, or programs written in raw assembly, will not have
these same signatures so a generic heuristic is also required. Additionally, many
Windows API functions will accept and return Unicode strings instead of ASCII
strings. The Unicode character set is 16-bits wide compared to 8-bit ASCII and
thus contain a much larger set of possible characters. When the printable ASCII
characters are represented in Unicode, each letter’s lower 8-bits are equivalent to the
ASCII-encoded character and the upper 8-bits are 0x00. These strings will currently
not be recorded by the string parsing heuristic since it stops recording a string when
it detects a NULL byte (0x00).
Now that there is a transparent system for recording runtime values of malicious
binaries, future research into what can be correlated from this data may prove useful in
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classification. Most current malware classification systems work by building statistical
correlations of the data present inside of a malicious binary file to other previously seen
binary files. Another classification method is to attempt the same type of correlation
based on the network activity or other observable events caused by a binary. Both of
these areas have shown promise in previous research and would be cause to examine
the potential of using internal runtime data for program correlation and attribution.
For instance, a malicious botnet binary may send and receive encrypted traffic to
a centralized command & control server that would not easily correlate to other
instances on the botnet since each message appears random. However, by monitoring
the application in EtherAnnotate the data should appear as a string variable at the
point in the binary where encrypted network traffic is decrypted. This additional
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